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“A logos that increases itself”:
response to Burley
TIMOTHY CHAPPELL
Mikel Burley says that he thinks that the Makropoulos debate can
make no sense unless talk about eternal life makes sense. Here is his
most striking argument that it doesn’t – that immortality is
inconceivable:
. . .the concepts [of birth, death, and sexual relations] are intern-
ally related to the concept of a human being in the sense that they
form part of the complex system of interrelated concepts of which
‘human being’ is a member. To understand what a human being
is, and hence to be able to operate competently with that concept,
one must also have some understanding of, among many other
things, what it means for a human being to be born, to form
sexual relationships, and to die. (Burley, ‘Immortality and
meaning: reﬂections on the Makropoulos debate’, Philosophy
84, 543–544)
Here, at ﬁrst sight, Burley appears to be making no more than some
unsurprising true generic claims about humans – that they get
born, that they have sex, that they die. Yet from these unsurprising
generic claims, Burley apparently infers a very surprising semantic
claim: that it would be a grammatical mistake, a piece of nonsense,
to speak of particular humans who didn’t die, or who in some way
or other lived after their deaths. This inference is simply a non sequi-
tur, just as it would be a non sequitur to infer from the generic premiss
that sex is part of human life to the semantic conclusion that it is non-
sensical to suggest that a particular human might be celibate.
Humans have 32 teeth, yet I have 31. Whatever the fans of
Winch-style argument by semantic decree may think, generic
claims can be truewithout that implying verymuch about which par-
ticular claims are true, false, ormeaningful. And in any case the books
are not as closed as Burley seems to think on which generic claims are
true about human beings. Perhaps our ancestors thought that
‘Humans with lots of black bile tend to melancholy’ was a generic
truth. If so, they were wrong. We get our generics from our con-
ception of humanity, and any conception of humanity, our own
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included, is almost certain to be both fallible and incomplete. The
suggestion that eternal life might be possible for humans may go
beyond the generic claims that we are sure of (or may not, depending
on who “we” are). That does not prove that it is either nonsensical or
false. Perhaps thewhole point of the claims of religion is to extend our
understanding of what it is to be human; perhaps Heracleitus was
right to say that ‘the psyche has a logos that increases itself’ (Diels
and Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 22 B 115).
I do rather wonder, anyway, whether Burley really means it when
he argues that discourse about immortal life is necessarily nonsensi-
cal. By the end of his article, he himself has slipped back into that dis-
course. The last phase of his paper develops the thought that
immortality can’t be desirable because a conception of eternal life
cannot mean much to me unless it is, as Burley (following Williams
and Nussbaum) thinks it can’t be, a conception of eternal life for me.
InWilliams’ original presentation of theMakropoulos argument, this
thoughtwaspart of an allegeddilemma: given the chance to live forever,
either I would necessarily run out of projects, or “my” future projects
would take me so far from where I am now that the future “me”
would no longer be me, and so would no longer be someone that I
have ﬁrst-personal reason to care about. In my European Journal of
Philosophy article, I said something – something that I think came to
more than mere assertion – about both horns of this dilemma. About
the ﬁrst horn, I observed that Williams’ odd focus on the strange case
of EM’s immortality – to the exclusion of other and more historically
prominent conceptions of immortality, such as the Christian con-
ception – meant that he did not do enough to exclude the possibility
that a person might have either one inﬁnitely inexhaustible project, or
an inﬁnite succession of exhaustible projects. About the second horn,
I observed that it had a presupposition that seems very odd given
Williams’ other writings on personal identity: the presupposition that
personal identity has to be a matter of ﬁxity of character.
Mymain comment on Burley’s ﬁnal argument, apart from querying
its coherence with what precedes it, is to take this last point a little
further. We should distinguish two importantly different thoughts.
One is the thought that I cannot care, in the special ﬁrst-personal way
in which we ‘care about our own futures’, about any future being that
is not identical with me. The other is the thought that I cannot care,
in the special ﬁrst-personal way in which we ‘care about our own
futures’, about any future being that is not uniquely psychologically
continuous with me. The ﬁrst thought is false; the second is true.
To see why, suppose, for example, that we adopt a robustly
Aristotelian conception of personal identity, according to which I am
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essentially male and essentially human. And suppose that – as The
Folk will most certainly express it – ‘I get turned into a crocodile’
(let’s call him Snappy) or ‘I get turned into a woman’ (let’s call her
Sophie). Either by a miracle or by technology or by an astonishing
cosmic ﬂuke, my body and my ﬁrst-personal stream of experience,
which are currently the male human Tim’s, both become at some
point the crocodile Snappy’s, or both become at some point the
female human Sophie’s. According to the Aristotelian, this modiﬁ-
cation of my body and transfer of my consciousness involves a
breach of my personal identity. For I, Tim, am essentially male. So
necessarily, nothing that is female, as Sophie is, can be identical with
me. And I, Tim, am essentially human. So necessarily, nothing that
is a crocodile, as Snappy is, can be identical with me. When Tim
goes under the knife to become Sophie, or for that matter Snappy,
he ceases to exist; as it sometimes – very misleadingly – put, he dies.
Even if we agree with the Aristotelian that personal identity has not
been preserved across these transformations, we need not agree that
ﬁrst-personal concern cannot be preserved across them. If I, Tim,
know that I am going to be transformed into Sophie, then it seems
entirely reasonable for me to be concerned now about what will
happen to Sophie after that transformation – even if my theory of
personal identity (be it Aristotelian, or about ﬁxity of character, or
whatever) makes me deny on conceptual grounds that Sophie can
be, or will be, the very same person as Tim.
For my ﬁrst-personal concern for a future being, e.g. Sophie, to be
reasonable, it will very often sufﬁce that I should know that my ﬁrst-
personal consciousness now is going to be continuous with Sophie’s
ﬁrst-personal consciousness once she appears on the scene some time
in the future. As to whether Sophie is, stricto dicto, ‘the same person’
as me, I may well neither know nor care.
Sowhen I am assessing a future state to decidewhether it is a future
that I now can care about or desire ﬁrst-personally, personal identity
does not have to be what matters. What must matter, I think, is con-
tinuity of consciousness. But whether that aligns with personal iden-
tity is an entirely open question. It all depends on your theory of
personal identity.
Suppose then that Williams, or Burley in his non-Winchian mode,
can show that some possible transformation of EM, which would
allow her to carry on having a good life, would not be identity-
preserving because it would not preserve (enough) ﬁxity of character;
and suppose also that this transformation would preserve continuity
of consciousness. In that case, for anyone who cares about EM’s well-
being, a reasonable response to Williams or Burley is: ‘So what if
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‘EM’ won’t be stricto dicto the same person after this transformation?
Who cares about that, provided the new EM is a continuous con-
sciousness with the present one, and is happy?’
Similarly, suppose someone can show that some future transform-
ation of me as is imagined in the theology of Heaven, some increase of
the logos of my soul into some exalted being experiencing enlighten-
ment or mystica unio with the Divinity, would not be
personally-identical with this Tim here – though that being is
conscious-continuous with me. Here too, for those who care about
me (such as myself), the same response is reasonable: ‘So what if,
after this transformation, “I” won’t be stricto dicto the same person
as I am now?Who cares about that, provided the celestial me is a con-
tinuous consciousness with the present one, and is happy?’
Unless a grain of wheat falls into the ground, and dies, it comes to
nothing (John 12.24). Perhaps philosophers who want think con-
structively about immortality, in particular about the Christian doc-
trine of immortality, should take more seriously an idea that is central
to that doctrine: that the only place for the hope of immortal life to
begin, is in the death of the self.
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